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itched battles are a regular occurrence in northern Alberta, 
Canada, as development of the province’s oil sands contin-
ues to expand. One ongoing battle—with another salvo 
launched in February 2011 with the leak of a European 
Commission report
1—concerns how dirty oil sands are, 
relative to other fuels. Another concerns the influence of the 
oil sands industry in monitoring its own activity.
2 In an effort to cut through 
the rhetoric of health advocates, industry representatives, environmentalists, 
government officials, and local residents, the Royal Society of Canada (RSC) 
selected and covered expenses for an expert panel to winnow out the facts.
In a report issued 15 December 2010
3 the panel cited substantial evi-
dence that efforts to extract oil from the Alberta deposits have degraded air, 
land, and water quality to varying degrees. The extent of the degradation is 
sometimes controversial; water quality data, in particular, are subject to dif-
fering interpretations and attributions of causality. However, the panel says 
that, based on publicly available evidence, there appear to be no significant 
human health threats to the general population either now or from devel-
opment anticipated in the next decade or so.
But the panel also warns that their conclusions come with a major 
caveat: there are major gaps in health and environmental data, risk assess-
ments, government oversight, information transparency, industry efforts, 
and disaster preparedness. The health of the region could hinge on these 
gaps being addressed, particularly since, according to Travis Davies, a 
spokesman for the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 97% of 
projected oil extraction and processing is still to come.
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The Athabasca River runs by Suncor Energy’s 
oil sands upgrader facility near Fort McMurray. 
Fort Chipewyan lies about 280 km upstream.  
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 After the RSC panel reviewed reams of publicly available infor-
mation on factors such as health status, air and water pollution, 
greenhouse gas emissions, land disturbance, and energy and water 
consumption, it concluded that “[t]he claim by some critics of the oil 
sands industry that it is the most environmentally destructive project 
on earth is not supported by the evidence. However, for Canada and 
Alberta, the oil sands industry involves major environmental issues 
on many fronts which must be addressed as a high priority.”
3p293
Digging and Drilling
Sprawling across much of northern Alberta’s boreal forest under 
an area a little smaller than the U.S. state of Illinois lies a valuable 
blend of bitumen, sand, minerals, and other materials.
4 For cen-
turies, native peoples
5 valued the tarry blend for repairing canoes. 
Today, improving technology has made it possible to extract the 
bitumen and process it into products similar to those produced 
from crude oil. With today’s technology, about 27 billion m3—or 
around 10%—of the estimated bitumen deposits can be economi-
cally extracted.
4 
That puts Canada’s oil reserves second only to Saudi Arabia’s 
42 billion m3 and a little ahead of Iran’s 23 billion.
6 By 2025, bitumen 
extraction is expected to rise 2.3 times over 2010 activity.
7 No one 
is willing to hazard a guess about peak activity timing or magnitude 
because investments are driven by unpredictable factors such as world 
oil prices, future technological advances, government regulation, 
development of alternative energy sources, and world events such as 
terrorism and climate change.
Extracting oil from the sands is expensive, but the 40 or so com-
panies working the fields are finding it lucrative, with net profits 
of $22.8 billion in 2008.
3p3 Preprofit expenses include payments to 
the Government of Alberta: $3.8 billion in 2008 alone compared 
with $11.9 billion over the preceding 10 years.
3p3 Alberta has had a 
financial stake in the oil sands for about 80 years, since the Canadian 
federal government transferred ownership of most natural resources 
to their respective provinces.
3p17
Surface mining is the only feasible process for extracting bitumen 
deposits down to a depth of 75 m. These are spread under about 
4,800 km2 of the Athabasca oil sands region, or 3.3% of the 142,000-
km2 bitumen-bearing zone, and account for about 20% of the 
estimated reserves and about 55% of current bitumen extraction.
8,9 
When deposits are deeper than 150 m, companies drill down and use 
steam heat to liberate the bitumen, a process known as in situ extrac-
tion. By 2015, in situ extraction is expected to dominate bitumen 
production, according to Davies.
Each process has its environmental tradeoffs. As of March 2009, sur-
face mining had already disturbed more than 602 km2 of land
8 and led 
to the creation of about 130 km2 of tailings ponds that contain dozens of 
toxic substances.
10,11 Surface mining also requires 4–6 times more fresh 
water withdrawal than in situ extraction.
3p51 In situ extraction, on the other 
hand, has a carbon footprint about one-
third greater than that of surface min-
ing. Both processes involve “enormous 
land disturbance and reclamation issues 
that encompass . . . the scarred land-
scape left by surface mines and the for-
est clearing that is characteristic of in 
situ production.”
3p29 All these effects are 
particularly relevant to the First Nations 
peoples whose reserves (traditional 
hunting grounds) are located on or near 
the oil sands deposits. 
Although the RSC panel found no 
evidence that people are currently being 
harmed by oil sands activity, that con-
clusion is based on testing for only a 
limited number of substances and reli-
ance on some standards that may not 
be fully protective, says Kevin Timoney, 
an ecologist and principal investigator 
with Alberta-based Treeline Ecological 
Research. Moreover, chronic effects 
cannot yet be ruled out, and any health 
impacts later attributed to oil sands 
development could potentially affect 
tens of thousands of people living and 
working in and near the deposits.
3p200 
Uncertain Impacts 
There are more than 1,400 known 
pollutants  emitted  by  oil  sands 
operations.
3p222 Among the few that are monitored are sulfur oxides 
(SOX), nitrogen oxides (NOX), hydrocarbons, and fine particulate 
matter (PM2.5).
12 Emissions of SOX and other sulfur compounds, 
NOX, and total hydrocarbons have been rising during the past 
decade, but the RSC panel concluded that “current ambient air 
quality monitoring data for the region show minimal air quality 
impacts from oil sands development . . . except for noxious odour 
emission problems over the past two years.”
3p281
Indeed, hydrogen sulfide at three monitored industrial sites has 
exceeded the 1-hour guideline
13 more than 2,400 times across three 
locations during the past decade and exceeded the 24-hour standard 
more than 400 times in the same period.
3p105 Data on exceedances of 
the hydrogen sulfide guideline were not available for Fort McKay, a 
small village 54 km north of the boom town of Fort McMurray, but 
the RSC authors conclude that there are serious odor problems in this 
and possibly other locations: “Resolution of the odour problems being 
caused by oil sands development is clearly necessary.”
3p227 
In late 2009 these houses were selling for around US$450,000 at a new property development in 
Fort McMurray, a boom town about 30 km south of the nearest oil sands operations. Transient work-
ers with the oil sands and other industries make population estimates tricky, but by one estimate 
the population of Fort McMurray grew by 80% between 2000 and 2010, reaching nearly 77,000; it is 






































Alberta Environment spokeswoman Jessica Potter says her agency 
expects industry to solve the problem. “We put in effect an environmental 
protection order [EPO]
14 to ensure this happens,” she says. “EPOs are 
enforceable by law, and disregarding an EPO can result in criminal charges.” 
Meanwhile, Davies says his members are working on the issue. “It’s 
a learn-as-you-go scenario,” he says. “We’re trying to find different 
ways to fix it.”
Annual average concentrations of SOX, NOX, PM2.5, and car-
bon monoxide (CO) from 2001 to 2008 in Fort McMurray were 
about one-third to three-fourths the concentrations in Alberta’s 
major urban areas of Edmonton and Calgary,
3p95–97 although Fort 
McMurray exceeded provincial 24-hour average PM2.5 allowances 
12 times compared with Edmonton’s 9.
3p97 PM2.5 exceedances at 
Fort McKay have been more than double those at the village of 
Anzac, located in the middle of traditional oil and gas operations, 
although the exceedances cannot be directly attributed to oil sands 
operations since other activities are 
occurring in each area. As anecdotal 
evidence of potential particulate mat-
ter concerns, a panel commissioned 
by Environment Canada to evaluate 
the impacts of oil sands operations 
referred to the “ubiquitous dust” that 
was present during their site visits.
15 
Findings in two small air pollutant 
personal exposure studies involving 
participants wearing portable moni-
tors in four regional communities 
demonstrated indoor air provided 
higher contaminant exposures than 
ambient air.
16,17
Total industry-estimated volumes 
of SOX, NOX, PM2.5, CO, volatile 
organic compounds, polycyclic aro-
matic hydrocarbons (PAHs), lead, 
mercury, and cadmium put the oil 
sands industry in anywhere from 
third to twelfth place—depending on 
the pollutant—among all Canadian 
industrial sources.
3p102 
Downwind from oil sands opera-
tions,  elevated  NOX  concentra-
tions that can contribute to aquatic 
acidification have been detected at 
least 150 km east of the Alberta–
Saskatchewan border, but elevated 
SOX from oil sands was not detected 
at any location in Saskatchewan. 
One study found elevated concen-
trations of polycyclic aromatic com-
pounds (PACs) in snowmelt within 
50 km of oil sands operations.
18 Despite reductions in emissions per 
barrel of bitumen produced, Hrudey says greenhouse gas emissions 
from oil sands production are about 5% of Canada’s total and are 
expected to continue rising because of production increases that out-
strip efficiency gains. 
Water pollution can potentially occur via many pathways. Massive 
tailings ponds associated with surface mining contain numerous 
toxic contaminants, including naphthenic acids, polar and satu-
rated hydrocarbons, asphaltenes, benzene, phenols, cresols, phtha-
lates, toluene, lead, mercury, arsenic, nickel, vanadium, chromium, 
and selenium.
3p124 These can leach at low concentrations through 
dams and dikes, and although seepage rates must be quantified, the 
RSC panel notes that “very few published data are available on the 
dynamics of ground  water flow and the fate of process water contami-
nants in the impoundment structure.”
3p122 Volatile contaminants can 
be transported by air, and if a tailings impoundment were to rupture, 
local wetlands and waterways would face a catastrophic influx of 
contaminants.
3p39 
In situ extraction processes, which use steam heated to more than 
250ºC, can alter subsurface dynamics such as leaching of arsenic 
into groundwater.
3p141 Deep-well injection of wastes can increase 
the potential for groundwater and surface water contamination. 
Groundwater withdrawals have lowered the water table at least 
40 m in some locations, altering the flows between surface water and 
groundwater.
19 Overall, the RSC panel concludes, the complex inter-
actions between surface and subsurface waters are poorly understood. 
The Athabasca River is the largest single source for water for the 
oil sands industry, and maximum allowable water use that could occur 
would consume 16% of the historical 7-day low river flow. Under the 
current water management framework for the Athabasca River, oil 
sands facilities are allocated 3.5% of the average annual river flow and 
use less than 1%.
20 River flow has fallen about 25–30% since the mid-
1970s as precipitation declined and industrial uses increased.
21 There 
are few financial incentives to reduce water use,
3p275 but Hrudey says 
the RSC deemed the regulatory mechanisms in place capable of man-
aging this issue. 
Studies have found that many toxics, such as PACs, antimony, 
arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, mercury, selenium, 
and zinc, can occur at higher concentrations downstream of oil 
sands operations than upstream (in some cases all the way to Lake 
Athabasca), and some of these are elevated enough to kill fish.
3p147 But 
it remains to be determined if oil sands operations are the primary 
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Suncor Millennium Mine, north of Fort McMurray. In its December 2010 report, an expert panel 
commissioned by Environment Canada to assess oil sands monitoring research wrote, “[O]ur site 
visits had an indelible impact. It is hard to forget the sheer extent of landscape disruption, the coke 
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cause of these higher levels. Concentrations of toxic metals measured 
in the Athabasca River downstream of oil sands plants were much 
lower than Canadian requirements for drinking water.
22
Preparing for the Worst
Toxicity threats could become a major concern if there is a techno-
logical or natural disaster. A wide range of process accidents have 
already occurred, including numerous spills from processing plants 
and pipelines,
23 fires and explosions at facilities, fires on wastewater 
ponds, and the deaths of more than 2,000 waterfowl that landed on 
various tailings ponds in multiple incidents.
3p129
Companies are required by law to submit environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) that include plans for dealing with disasters, 
Davies says. But those paper plans don’t always reflect a compre-
hensive analysis of what could go wrong, considering actual past 
events, according to the RSC authors: “There have been large gaps 
in information submitted in EIAs that have not been required by the 
government nor provided by the companies, specifically dealing with 
consequences of technological disasters.”
3p234 They also note that 
EIAs rarely address how a company will deal with extreme weather 
such as floods, torrential rains, high winds, bitter cold, and droughts 
and related forest fires.
3p235 
Annual performance reports (assessments of the performance of 
oil sands tailings dams during operations and construction), inde-
pendent dam safety reviews (which are required every five years), 
and emergency preparedness plans (descriptions of actions to be 
taken in the event a dam fails) are all available to the public through 
Alberta’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy (FOIP) 
Act. Potter says emergency response plans (i.e., call-down lists or tele-
phone trees) are the only documents that are not publicly available.  
But Hrudey says information like this should be much more read-
ily available to the public. Gillian McEachern of the advocacy group 
Environmental Defence explains that being forced to rely solely on 
the FOIP process for public access can keep quite a bit of information 
effectively out of reach. She says when her organization has used FOIP 
at the provincial or federal level, they have at times been denied, expe-
rienced lengthy delays far past the required release date, or received 
documents that were extensively redacted, limiting their usefulness. 
Potential disasters aside, the combined effects of boom-town 
development and deficits in health care infrastructure are among the 
suspects in a number of poorer population health indicators for the 
region encompassing oil sands development compared with other 
similarly remote and low-density regions of Alberta.
3p288 That pat-
tern indicates to the RSC panel that efforts to improve the situation 
are essential: “There are obvious health indicator disparities that are 
not acceptable in a region that is generating so much wealth for the 
province and the country, and these disparities need to be addressed 
regardless of their cause.”
3p238
André Corriveau, chief medical officer of health for Alberta Health 
and Wellness, says his agency has been working with other stakeholders 
on plans for a comprehensive health assessment, including biomonitor-
ing and air and water quality monitoring, for the community of Fort 
Chipewyan. That small town was the setting for a controversial cancer 
cluster claim in the mid-2000s. The RSC report concludes that, based 
on the available evidence, there are no convincing data showing a link 
between cancers at Fort Chipewyan and oil sands operations but that 
additional monitoring and research are warranted.
3p227 
Corriveau says he is waiting on the outcome of pending com-
munity consultations so new work can begin there. He also says he 
has had preliminary discussions with oil sands company representa-
tives regarding access to internal data on current health monitoring of 
workers that could be relevant for analysis of potential occupational 
health impacts. No other health studies specific to oil sands are in the 
works, he says.
One of the primary issues in conducting such studies, and in the 
RSC panel’s conclusion of no serious current health problems caused 
by oil sands operations, is the inadequacy of some current health 
standards, Timoney says. For instance, he says Health Canada’s 
guideline for mercury in fish is much higher than that of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and there are no guidelines for 
important pollutants such as PAHs in sediment that can get into fish 
and drinking water. In addition, he says that “standards and guide-
lines are only useful if they are followed and enforced. Enforcement 
is the exception rather than the rule.”
A Shift in Direction?
Existing laws provide clear guidance to the Government of Alberta 
about how to adequately manage environmental impacts of oil 
sands development, concludes the RSC panel: “[T]he govern-
ment simply needs to respect the letter of its own legislation.”
3p290 
But that’s been difficult, as provincial and federal agencies—even 
The RSC panel found that the available evidence did not support  
a link between cancers at Fort Chipewyan and oil sands operations, 
although  additional  monitoring  and  research  are  warranted. 
That leaves this Fort Chipewyan woman still uncertain over what 
caused  the  lung  cancer  that  killed  her  mother,  husband,  and  










































with overlapping jurisdictions, responsibilities, and agreements—
have not always demonstrated optimal regulatory capacity or 
management.
3p78
Those struggles continue today and were one reason why the 
RSC panel determined “there was little evidence available to us that 
implementation of meaningful improvements has begun or will be 
achieved in an adequately rapid time frame.”
3p295
Many agencies and organizations have monitoring systems in place 
in an effort to track certain health and environmental impacts related 
to oil sands development. But a decade after bitumen extraction 
began to rapidly increase, the overall system remains weak, accord-
ing to the panel of experts commissioned by Environment Canada.
15 
That panel, which released its report a week after the RSC’s, says the 
current monitoring program is “dwarfed by the level of activity that 
was expended on other major environmental issues of the past few 
decades, such as the acid deposition problem in eastern Canada,”
15p30 
and that it is riddled with inadequacies, including poor leadership, a 
lack of clear objectives, weak decisionmaking processes, poor project 
design, and fragmented and incomplete systems, projects, and data.
Some of the sharpest criticism was directed toward the industry-
funded Regional Aquatics Monitoring Program (RAMP), whose 
members include industry, government, and First Nations organiza-
tions. RAMP was formed in 1997 in accordance with recommenda-
tions by Environment Canada to monitor the health of water bodies 
in the oil sands region. Along with the problems noted above, the 
Environment Canada authors say RAMP has poor scientific leader-
ship and data transparency and fails to communicate well with 
scientists and the public.
15 RAMP officials say they are reviewing 
the Environment Canada and RSC reports, as well as that of a pro-
vincially commissioned scientific panel that was released in January 
2011, which, consistent with the other reports, recommended exten-
sive changes to the current program.
24 
The Environment Canada panelists echoed the findings of the 
RSC authors when they wrote, “[W]ork carried out to date has not 
led to a consensus on the degree of impacts [of oil sands develop-
ment]. . . . However, there is not a widespread scientific acceptance 
of this negative finding because of the lack of complete confidence 
in the monitoring system that produced the result.”
15p31 The panel 
wrapped up its report with a series of conceptual recommendations 
for an improved monitoring system and said industry should pay 
any new costs.
15p42 Davies of the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers says association members “are willing to pay for a world-
class system. I think it’s in our best interest.”
Several agencies and organizations say changes are on the way. 
Alberta Environment officials acknowledge they have done little to assess 
or address cumulative impacts of oil sands development, but are begin-
ning to evaluate how to do so. Potter says they are looking at how to 
improve the financial security structure so the oil sands industry is held 
accountable for failures and disasters. 
Another effort in process, with full implementation expected 
by 2012, is a revision of reclamation requirements and oversight 
at the national and provincial level. In addition, officials at Alberta 
Environment are working collaboratively with the federal government to 
examine the technical aspects of a physical network for water monitoring 
in the oil sands region. The federal panel’s recommendations for water 
monitoring are expected in March 2011. Alberta will incorporate those 
findings into its own review, expected by June 2011. “The federal gov-
ernment panel is only looking at technical aspects of a physical network 
for water monitoring in the oil sands region; the provincial panel will 
include the necessary governance, reporting, validation, and analyses por-
tions,” Potter says. “This will be expanded to air, land, and bio  diversity 
not just for the oil sands but across the province.” 
The day after the Environment Canada panel report was released, 
RAMP posted online data related to topics such as water quality, 
sediment quality, aquatic vegetation, benthic invertebrates, and 
acid-sensitive lakes.
25 The newly released database does not include 
groundwater monitoring reports, Price says, although his organiza-
tion has sometimes been able to acquire such reports after hiring 
investigators to scour government libraries. The industry has also 
improved in areas such as tailings pond management and energy 
efficiency,
3p40 and Davies says “the onus is on the industry to con-
tinue to improve their performance.”
Such a commitment is welcomed by Terra Simieritsch, senior 
policy analyst with the Pembina Institute, a Canadian environ-
mental think tank. “There are many changes required in order to 
shift oil sands development towards a path where it is being done 
responsibly,” she says. “We’ve seen a lot of denial of the impacts. 
There’s been a lot of focus on public relations, whereas the focus 
should be on what is actually happening on the ground.” When 
asked if she expects changes that are beneficial from her perspective 
to occur, she’s hesitant, but leaves the door open: “It remains to be 
determined.”
Bob Weinhold, MA, has covered environmental health issues for numerous outlets since 1996. He is 
a member of the Society of Environmental Journalists. 
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